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Deep Economic Integration Between
Canada and the United States, the
Emergence of Strategic Innovation
Policy and the Need for Trade
Law Reform
J.-G. Castel, Q.C. and C.M. Gastle*
Although antidumping and countervailing duty remedies
have political appeal in the United States, they are not appropri-
ate to meet the needs of either Canada or the United States.
Antidumping duties are intended to respond to international
price discrimination, while countervailing duties are intended to
respond to government subsidization. They are unprincipled
and provide substantial opportunity for abuse. They inhibit
Canada's goal of secure access to the American market and leave
vulnerable Canada's attempts at stimulating innovative activ-
ity. They do not recognize the current degree of economic inte-
gration between the two countries and tend to reward anti-
competitive practices evident in other nations which are not
caught within the reach of the existing remedies. The mainte-
nance of such remedies is not in the interest of the United States
as they hinder the promotion of consumer welfare, which has
become the dominant value in American antitrust law. They
also do not contribute to the reduction of barriers in foreign mar-
kets or increase economic integration of fully open markets.
Substantively, international trade law remedies need a new
organizing principle. The existing antidumping and counter-
* J.-G. Castel, J.D. (Mich.), S.J.D. (Harvard), is Distinguished Research
Professor and Professor of International Trade Law, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, Toronto; Member of Special Group under Chapter 19
Can.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 1989-1994.
C.M. Gastle, B. Comm., LL.B., LL.M., is a member of the Bar of Ontario and a
partner at Shibley Righton, Toronto.
This paper is based on presentations made by the authors to the House of Com-
mons Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes of the Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, in Ottawa, on October 9, 1996, and March 5,
1997.
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vailing duty practices find their origin at the turn of the nine-
teenth century, at a time when economies had not yet
integrated.' They are based upon a concept of territorial sover-
eignty2 in which each nation has the exclusive authority to act
as it pleases within its own home market, and they provide a
right to impose retaliatory tariffs when "dumping" or "subsidiza-
tion" causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic
industry. In a time of deep economic integration, the continued
existence of antidumping and countervailing duty remedies can-
not be defended in a principled manner and both should be elim-
inated. International remedies should be based upon
competition law or market access principles in a manner
designed to achieve greater openness. Once nations commit
themselves to maintain open markets, the presumptions im-
plicit in the trade law remedies should permit government pro-
grams directed at stimulating growth, facilitating structural
change, and building confidence within the economy. Interna-
tional trade law remedies should not be based upon a principle
of territorial sovereignty per se, but upon a recognition of the
right or interest which nations have in each of the national mar-
kets, and the conditions of trade therein, which comprise a re-
gionally-based or an internationally-integrated economy.
If it proves impossible to eliminate antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty remedies, North American innovation policies
should be coordinated. There are no spending trends yet evident
to suggest that the North American Free Trade Agreement 3
(NAFTA) has caused a diversion in technology spending by Ca-
nadian subsidiaries from Canada into the United States. Coor-
dination of Canadian programs into a North American
innovation system provides insulation from the emergence of in-
novation policy in the United States as a kind of strategic trade
initiative. International reform could be achieved by broadening
the research and development "non-actionable" category in the
1. Countervailing duties were first established in the United States as a
relief mechanism via the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151,
205 (1899). 3 JOSEPH E. PATTISON, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAws 1-16, nn.1- 2 (3d ed. 1996). Antidumping laws were first enacted by Can-
ada in 1904 and in the United States in 1916, although their roots can be traced
back to the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894. J. MICHAEL
FINGER, ANTIDUMPING: How IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT 14-19 (1993).
2. For a good discussion of the concept of territorial sovereignty, see SIR
H.J.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 73-112 (1905).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
U.S.-Mex.-Can., entered into force Jan. 1, 1994, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 and
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duty Measures 4 (Subsidies Code) into a technol-
ogy exemption which is at least co-extensive with the existing
practices of key American technology consortia. The exemption
should be based on the growing recognition that innovation is a
discontinuous, dynamic phenomenon and not a linear process in
which legal rules can easily identify inappropriate government
support.
NAFTA Chapter 19 currently replaces domestic judicial re-
view of final determinations made in antidumping and counter-
vailing duty disputes by domestic tribunals. The binational
panels are required to apply the domestic standard of judicial
review and must accept the exercise of discretion granted to the
tribunals by their governing statutes. In this article we recom-
mend that antidumping and countervailing duty mechanisms
should be eliminated, and if such a reform were to occur, Chap-
ter 19 would be unnecessary. If these mechanisms are not elimi-
nated, we believe that the binational process should be
reformed to make dispute settlement under NAFTA more effec-
tive and less susceptible to criticism.
In Section I, we argue that antidumping practices should be
eliminated in the context of North American trade, as no princi-
pled difference in treatment can be justified between United
States domestic antitrust and international laws on discrimina-
tory pricing. In section II, we recommend the elimination of
countervailing duty practices in the context of North American
trade. Once a commitment to deep economic integration exists
and there are no impediments to trade, all subsidies within
North America should be treated in the same manner. Ameri-
can industrial subsidies overwhelm the level of subsidies in Can-
ada, yet state and federal subsidies are exempt from review
within the United States under antitrust laws and the com-
merce clause. In section III, we suggest that Canada should at-
tempt to integrate its innovation programs into American
programs where possible. Further, the research and develop-
ment 'non-actionable' category in the Subsidies Code appears to
be based on a flawed linear model of innovation. A technology
exemption should be implemented which is based upon the
4. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS-THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 264 (1994) [hereinafter
Subsidies Code].
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growing recognition that innovation is a dynamic process, and
that the challenge facing North American industry is more the
successful commercialization of technology than the promotion
of basic research. In section IV, we suggest, among other re-
forms, that the NAFTA Chapter 19 mechanism should free
panels from the domestic standard of judicial review by chang-
ing to an arbitration process. An option which we favor would
be to replace the ad hoc panel system with a permanent interna-
tional trade review tribunal. A further and alternative route of
reform would be to eliminate the Chapter 19 mechanism in favor
of binding and enforceable WTO Dispute Settlement Body deci-
sions, at least in antidumping and countervailing duty disputes
involving NAFTA parties.
I. ANTIDUMPING AND ITS CHILLING EFFECT UPON
LEGITIMATE PRICE COMPETITION
In general terms, antidumping practices allow a nation to
impose duties if there is price discrimination between the home
and export market.5 They require foreign exporters to price
equal to or above a fully-allocated cost standard. This bias is
compounded in certain circumstances by allowing domestic
tribunals to construct artificially the base or "home market"
cost, allowing the use of unjustifiable presumptions. 6 A finding
of material injury or threat of injury to domestic competitors is
required, and this becomes the limiting condition for the imposi-
tion of duties.7 Where integrated economies exist, allegations of
predatory pricing provide the only adequate basis for an interna-
tional discriminatory pricing mechanism. It is appropriate to
have a remedy for predatory pricing, in which one country's
5. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS-THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 168
(1994) [hereinafter Antidumping Code].
6. In the past, American practices required the inclusion of an 8% profit
factor, even where American competitors had never achieved such a profit. N.
David Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative Nontariff
Barrier, in DowN IN THE Dumps 64, 75 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991). Article 2.2 of the Antidumping Code provides a "reasonable amount...
for profits." See Antidumping Code, supra note 5, art. 2.2. Article 2.2.2 provides
that profits "shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in
the ordinary course of trade of the like product." Id. art. 2.2.2.
7. J.-G. CASTEL ET AL., THE CANADIAN LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 504 (2d ed. 1997); see generally id., at 495-538 (describing GATT
law of dumping and subsidies, especially as implemented in Canada).
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manufacturers attempt to drive competitors from another coun-
try out of the market so they can then raise prices and earn ex-
traordinary returns. The circumstances in which the conditions
for successful predation exist are rare.
One major problem with antidumping practices is that they
allow the imposition of duties without proof of predatory intent
and when foreign exporters are acting reasonably in the same
manner as domestic competitors. Economic theory holds that
companies act reasonably when the price of a good is at least
equal to its marginal cost.8 Areeda and Turner have proposed a
test of predation based upon marginal cost, using average varia-
ble cost as a surrogate and, while their test has had a significant
impact upon antitrust jurisprudence, it has not been endorsed
by the Supreme Court. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp.,9 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion fol-
lowed earlier decisions in refusing to comment upon the
appropriate cost standard for the determination of predation. 10
The Court held that two prerequisites must be established: first,
the prices complained of must be below "an appropriate measure
of its rival's costs"1 and, second, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the competitor "had a reasonable prospect or ... a danger-
ous probability, of recouping its investment.... " 12 The require-
ment of recoupment makes predatory pricing extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to establish, and so there is a strong bias in
American antitrust law to protect price competition:
Recoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing
scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from predation.
Without it, predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the
market, and consumer welfare is enhanced. Although unsuccessful
8. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 702 n.18
(1975).
9. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
10. Id. at 222 n.1 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S.
104, 117-18 n.12 (1986)).
11. Id. at 222. The Court applied an average variable cost standard in
Brooke Group because both parties agreed that this was the appropriate stan-
dard. Id. Phillip Areeda represented the appellant and Robert Bork repre-
sented the respondent. Id. at 211.
12. Id. at 224. Specifically, the Court interprets § 2 of the Sherman Act to
"condemn predatory pricing when it poses 'a dangerous probability of actual
monopolization,'" id. at 222 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506
U.S. 447, 455 (1993)), "whereas the Robinson-Patman Act requires only that
there be 'a reasonable possibility' of substantial injury to competition before its
protections are triggered." Id. (quoting Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Bev-
erage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434 (1983)).
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predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution toward
the product being sold at less than its cost, unsuccessful predation is in
general a boon to consumers.
That below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is
of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured: It is
axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for "the protection of
competition, not competitors."
13
The Supreme Court required proof of recoupment in Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 14 which
involved allegations of international price discrimination. This
was an action brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
against 21 Japanese television manufacturers. 15 The suit al-
leged that they had conspired over a twenty-year period to drive
American firms from the American electronics market by engag-
ing in a scheme to fix and maintain artificially high prices for
television sets sold by them in Japan and, at the same time, to
fix and maintain low prices for the sets exported to and sold in
the United States.16 The Supreme Court held that recoupment
was necessary and that "there is a consensus among commenta-
tors that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful" 17 because "the predator must make a
substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay off." s8
The Court noted that the goal of the alleged conspiracy to charge
monopoly pricing was, after twenty years of operation, still "yet
far distant."19 The Court found that there was "nothing to sug-
gest any relationship between petitioners' profits in Japan and
the amount petitioners could expect to gain from a conspiracy to
monopolize the American market" and "[wihether or not peti-
tioners have the means to sustain substantial losses in this
country over a long period of time, they have no motive to sus-
tain such losses absent some strong likelihood that the alleged
conspiracy in this country will eventually pay off."20
13. Id. at 224 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
14. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
15. Id. at 577-78.
16. Id. at 578.
17. Id. at 589.
18. Id. (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-
strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981)).
19. Id. at 591. The Court also noted that "the two largest shares of the
retail market in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Zenith, not by
any of petitioners. Moreover, those shares, which together approximate 40% of
sales, did not decline appreciably during the 1970s." Id. (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 593 (emphasis in original). In addition to the antitrust action, a
series of trade law proceedings were undertaken. Harry First, An Antitrust
Remedy for International Price Predation: Lessons from Zenith v. Matsushita, 4
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A. THE CASE TO ELIMINATE ANTIDUMPING LAW
The distinction between antitrust and trade law principles
is striking. Professor Wood has stated that "it has become the
accepted wisdom that there is an irreconcilable conflict between
the antitrust laws, with their consumer welfare orientation, and
the trade statutes, with their producer or labor orientation."21
In an integrated North American economy, what justification
can there be for a difference in treatment between United
States' domestic and international laws on discriminatory pric-
ing, except political expediency based upon an out-moded con-
cept of territorial sovereignty? American consumers are the
beneficiaries whether the source of price competition is Ameri-
can or Canadian competitors.
With respect to NAFTA members, the only effective reform
of antidumping practices is to get rid of them. Disputes alleging
predatory price discrimination could then be resolved using do-
mestic competition law, which would be harmonized or other-
wise coordinated between NAFTA members, or at least between
Canada and the United States. Canadian and American trade
negotiators agreed in 1987, at the time of the Canada-United
States free trade negotiations, that antidumping practices
should be replaced with competition laws which would be har-
monized between the jurisdictions. The reform was not imple-
mented because of American concern over Canadian subsidy
practices at the time.22 The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment provides that antidumping practices are to be phased out
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 211 (1994). As a result of the proceedings, an Orderly
Marketing Agreement was implemented in 1977 which limited the import of
color televisions to 1.75 million per year for three years; in 1980 dumping duties
were settled at $77 million pursuant to the 1968 U.S. complaint; antidumping
orders remained in effect, and in 1991, the U.S. Department of Commerce found
dumping margins for eleven Japanese manufacturers between 1983 and 1990,
ranging from 0.16% to 35.4%. Id. at 219-22.
21. Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (1989). Professor Wood quotes Paula Stern, a former
Commissioner of the United States International Trade Commission:
Implicit in our trade law is the notion that U.S. workers and busi-
nesses should compete on the basis of comparative advantage, but they
should not have to adjust to unfairly traded goods. Consumers are ex-
pected to forgo the savings resulting from dumping or subsidies in the
interests of producers of the product.
Id. at 1154.
22. Michael Hart, Dumping and Free Trade Areas, in ANTIDUMPING LAw
AND PRACTICE 341 (Jackson & Vermulst eds., 1989).
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by 2003.23 Antidumping practices were also eliminated pursu-
ant to the terms of the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agree-
ment between Australia and New Zealand. 24
In the context of international price discrimination, the
Matsushita decision neatly encapsulates the inability of both
American antitrust law and antidumping and countervailing du-
ties to address the key issue.25 Lower prices in the United
States are beneficial to consumer welfare, particularly when
such pricing levels have lasted more than twenty years. An-
tidumping duties do nothing more than limit the benefit accru-
ing to American consumers. They also have the potential to
promote the coordination of an export cartel by the Japanese
government to raise prices. This discloses one of the bizarre con-
sequences of American trade laws: they can have the effect of
promoting the kind of anticompetitive activity the antitrust laws
are intended to prevent.26 The real problem is not the low prices,
but the absence of an effective international mechanism which
can force open the Japanese market. A principled international
23. Signed on Dec. 15, 1996, <http'//www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/englis/geo/lac/
cda-chili/menu.htm>. Article M-01 of the Agreement provides:
1. Subject to Article M-03, as of the date of entry into force of
this Agreement each Party agrees not to apply its domestic anti-
dumping law to goods of the other Party. Specifically:
(a) neither party shall initiate any anti-dumping investigations or
reviews with respect to goods of the other Party;
(b) each party shall terminate any ongoing anti-dumping investiga-
tions or inquiries in respect of such goods;
(c) neither Party shall impose new anti-dumping duties or other
measures in respect of such goods; and
(d) each party shall revoke all existing orders levying anti-dumping
duties in respect of such goods.
Id.
24. Australia-New Zealand: Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agree-
ment, Mar. 28, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 945 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1983). Bernard
M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Policy Externalities and High-Tech Ri-
valry: Competition and Multilateral Co-operation Beyond the WTO, in MARKET
ACCESS AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND: INVESTMENT, COMPETITION AND TECHNOL-
OGY PERSPECTIVES 187, 217 (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and De-
velopment ed., 1996).
25. We exclude the American Section 301 trade remedy, an analysis of
which is beyond the scope of this article.
26. On occasion, trade law remedies can have perverse results. The First
Semiconductor Agreement (1986), for instance, has been argued to have simply
increased the degree of collusiveness of the Japanese semiconductor industry by
requiring coordination of price and supply by the Japanese government through
its Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI). See generally KEmETH FLAMM, Mis-
MANAGED TRADE? STRATEGIC POLICY AND THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 159-
226 (1996).
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trade remedy would have market access as its objective, particu-
larly since the introduction of competition is an effective mecha-
nism to break down a cartelized industry.
II. THE ENIGMA OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY REFORM
Countervailing duty practices target government programs
which provide a specific advantage to a particular industrial seg-
ment and which cause material injury, or threaten material in-
jury, to the industry in the complaining nation.2 7 The United
States is the primary user of this mechanism, while Canada
uses it to a much lesser degree.28
The reform of countervailing duty practices is a politically-
charged issue in the United States and thus is a much more dif-
ficult problem than antidumping reform. The United States
made it clear at the time of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment negotiations that such reform was necessary before sub-
stantive reform of antidumping procedures would occur.
NAFTA did not address the issue of countervailing duty reform
and the American NAFTA implementing legislation established
that the "achievement of increased discipline on domestic subsi-
dies" was one of the key objectives of any future trade negotia-
tions.29 The Subsidies Code achieved limited reform by
introducing "non-actionable subsidies" for research and develop-
ment and environmental action as well as support for certain
economically depressed regions. 30
A. THE CASE TO ELIMINATE COUNTERVAILING DUTY PRACTICES
The solution to countervailing duty reform is that these
practices should be eliminated, at least within the North Ameri-
can context. Their theoretical foundation is that government
support distorts the market allocation of resources and, there-
fore, is economically inefficient. However, it is becoming in-
creasingly difficult to identify "normal conditions of trade,"
27. See Subsidies Code, supra note 4.
28. The United States is the source of 70% of the countervailing duty meas-
ures in force worldwide as of December 31, 1995. The statistics are: United
States, 72; European Community, 3; Canada, 6; Australia, 13; Mexico, 7; New
Zealand, 1; Brazil, 6; total, 108. 1996 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ANN. REP.
32.
29. Charles M. Gastle & Jean-G. Castel, Should the North American Free
Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Cases Be Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 823, 883 (1995).
30. Subsidies Code, supra note 4, art. 8.2(a)-(c).
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particularly in the high-technology sectors which have been the
recipient of government support through direct subsidization or
preferential procurement practices during the post-war era. The
United States continues to provide significant subsidies for high-
technology industries through a variety of programs.31 All gov-
ernments recognize the importance of innovative activity and
are increasing funding for research and development activity. If
the United States supports high-technology industries, why
should Canadian programs be vulnerable to the application of
countervailing duties simply because Canada supports different
industrial segments? Canada does not possess the range of
high-technology companies which exist in the United States,
whereas many American high-technology companies have re-
ceived significant government support in one form or another
during the post-war era.
31. The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1998 pro-
vides estimated 1997 and proposed 1998 technology spending as follows:
U.S. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS
(U.S. dollar amounts in millions)
CIVILIAN DEFENSE TOTAL
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998
Basic Research 13,747 14,112 1,138 1,191 14,885 15,303
Applied Research 10,469 11,125 4,060 4,034 14,529 15,159
Development 7,860 8,117 34,293 33,519 42,153 41,636
Equipment 492 506 445 454 937 960
Facilities 984 1,128 333 1,283 1,317 2,411
SUBTOTAL 33,552 34,988 40,269 40,481 73,821 75,469
H.R. Doc. No. 105-003, vol. III, at 78 (1997) (containing the budget of
the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 1998).
Placing this spending in perspective, the Office of Technology Policy of the
U.S. Department of Commerce indicates that research and development spend-
ing in other nations is as follows: France, Germany and the United Kingdom
invested more than $28 billion in 1993; the European Union is in the midst of
an $18 billion five-year effort to increase European competitiveness; the Euro-
pean Space Agency has an annual budget of $3.2 billion and spent $13.3 billion
through November 1995 through its Eureka program; Japan's research and de-
velopment spending amounted to $26.7 billion in 1996, but it has the goal of
doubling its budget by the year 2000, with the increases demonstrating "Ja-
pan's firm commitment to science and technology as the engine of economic
growth;" China intends to triple its expenditures on science and technology by
the year 2000 by increasing its percentage of GDP from .5% ($4 billion) to 1.5%
($12 billion), in addition to spending $250 billion in the next five years in the
infrastructure necessary to fuel growth; Korea spent $1.1 billion in 1996. OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY: EMERGING TRENDS IN GovERNMENT POLICIES AND EXPENDI-
TURES (1996). Canada is said to have spent $5 billion U.S. in fiscal year 1995-
96. Id. This is consistent with the Canadian government's own estimates of
spending in recent past years. 1 Government of Canada, RESOURCE BOOK FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONSULTATIONS tbl. 1.3 (1995).
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Countervailing duties should also be eliminated with re-
spect to Canadian and American trade because the United
States has an interest in the competitive health of the Canadian
economy. Through free trade, Canada committed itself to deep
integration with the American economy and an unprecedented
level of openness which caused significant structural adjustment
in a time of recession. An analysis of the openness of the Cana-
dian manufacturing industry indicates that the following com-
parison with the United States and Japan can be made:3 2
EXPOSURE TO FOREIGN COMPETITION
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
1980 1992 Change
United States 17.4 27.1 + 9.7%
Canada 51.6 62.8 +11.2%
Japan 16.2 16.7 + 0.5%
Total OECD 30.6 36.8 + 6.2%
In its manufacturing industry, Canada has an exposure to
foreign competition which is more than twice that of the United
States and four times that of Japan. Both Canada and the
United States' exposure to trade has grown significantly while
Japan has experienced no growth during a 12-year period
marked by globalization of the world economy. Japan continues
to have a concentrated industrial system dominated by
horizontal and vertical business groups known as keiretsu.33
One estimate is that these groups, each one including as many
as 6,000 companies, represent "no less than one-third of the
total Japanese economy ... [a]nd that is a rather conservative
guess."34 Apart from this structure, informal governance in
Japan is undertaken unofficially by trade associations and
cartels, 35 as well as through more official forms of government
32. This comparison is based upon the export share of production within an
industry combined with a weighted average of the import share of domestic con-
sumption. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, IN-
DUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY: SCOREBOARD OF INDICATORS 175 (1995).
33. See KENICHI MIYASHITA & DAVID W. RUSSELL, KEIRETSU. INSIDE THE
HIDDEN JAPANESE CONGLOMERATES 8-12 (1994).
34. Id. at 81.
35. One commentator described the manner in which Japanese domestic
businesses are protected as follows:
To understand the true scope of industrial policy, one must look
beyond official state-sponsored policies to unofficial policies initiated
and implemented by trade associations. Illegal cartels should not be
immediately dismissed as aberrant behavior by outlaw firms; in many
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
coordination, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry
("MITI"). The degree of concentration evident in Japanese
industry appears to have prevented or at least moderated the
kind of structural adjustment which would have occurred if the
same degree of openness existed in Japanese trade as exists in
Canadian trade. Instead of undergoing adjustment, Japanese
industries receive significant benefits through the keiretsu
structure, including: access to venture and expansion capital;
financial and managerial adjustment support in times of
financial downturns; access to preferential contractual
relationships; insulation from take-over through patterns of
cross-ownership; as well as the accessibility of detailed
marketing information relating to foreign markets through a
unique trading institution known as a sogo shosha, which also
provides trade insurance.36
The irony is that the concentration of the Japanese system
and collusive practices which can occur therein are beyond the
reach of international trade dispute mechanisms. The GATT
1994 and other WTO agreements contain no substantive
competition law provisions37 and, as a result, Japanese practices
are generally not actionable pursuant to international trade law
cases, they constitute governance tacitly delegated to private interests
as an extension of official state policy .... [Tihe trade associations that
run cartels do not function primarily as lobbying groups outside the
government but are seen as administrative organs that assist
government.
MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: CARTELS IN JAPAN'S BASIc MATERIALS INDUS-
TRIES 205 (1996).
36. See MIYASHITA & RUSSELL, supra note 33, at 53-59.
37. Hoekman and Mavroidis further explain:
[RIestrictive business practices can impede the contestability of
markets for foreign firms, and the WTO allows for only limited
recourse against governments that tolerate such business practices.
There are four "holes" in the WTO as far as competition policies are
concerned. First, there is no requirement that WTO Members have a
competition policy, let alone that it meet certain minimum standards.
Many Members have anti-trust [sic] legislation, but there are
significant differences in national laws, and, especially, in their
enforcement. Second, purely private business practices, not supported
by the government, that restrict access to markets cannot be attacked.
Third, practices by firms on export markets or government tolerance of
anti-competitive behaviour on export markets by firms headquartered
in its territory cannot be addressed-thus the oft-encountered
statement that there are no multilateral disciplines for export cartels.
Fourth, some firms may be so large as to have global market power. In
such cases, competition rules should in principle also be global, as no
single government may be able-even if willing-to control possible
anti-competitive behaviour.
Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 24, at 215.
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remedies. Why should collusiveness within the Japanese
system be tolerated as private action, when Canadian
government programs are actionable under existing
countervailing duty procedures? For that matter, why should
the United States apply the same trade law remedies to both
Canada and Japan, notwithstanding the openness of the
Canadian market and competition law environment which is
substantially the same as the American system? 38
Another reason why the United States has an interest in
promoting the level of innovation within Canada is that
Canadian subsidiaries spend more in the United States than do
Japanese subsidiaries with respect to research and
development, as Table I (in the appendix to this Article) shows.
In 1993, Canadian subsidiaries spent U.S. $2.4 billion while
Japanese subsidiaries spent U.S. $2.0 billion. 39 The Office of
Technology of the U.S. Department of Commerce has noted that,
in 1996, Japanese companies maintained 224 research and
development facilities in the United States. The Department of
Commerce views these facilities as a method by which Japan
can monitor and utilize U.S. and other foreign technology,
noting that "Japan traditionally has been weak in basic research
and has relied on foreign sources of technology. '40
Table II (also in the appendix) extends the comparison
between spending by Canadian and Japanese subsidiaries on
research and development. It shows that Canadian spending,
which constituted thirty percent of total foreign spending in the
United States in 1985, dropped to fifteen percent of total
spending by 1994. Spending by Japanese subsidiaries has
increased to thirteen percent. However, when manufacturing
spending is isolated, Canadian subsidiaries account for eighteen
percent and Japanese subsidiaries account for nine percent.
38. Of course, the antitrust provision for treble damages is a significant
difference between American and Canadian competition law.
39. See infra Table I. However, technology spending by Japanese
subsidiaries in the United States increased by 655% from 1987 to 1994. Id.
This indicates that Japanese spending will soon outpace spending by Canadian
subsidiaries in the United States.
40. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 31.
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B. THE PRESUMED EFFICIENCY OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC
SUBSIDIES
Countervailing duties should be eliminated because they re-
duce domestic social welfare in the importing country. 41 They
should also be eliminated because, in circumstances of deep inte-
gration, no principled distinction can be made between the com-
petitive impact in North America of a Canadian subsidy and
that of an American subsidy. Identical subsidies from Ontario
or New York will have the same competitive impact upon the
Michigan marketplace, yet according to American law, the Onta-
rio subsidy may be actionable under countervailing duty prac-
tices while the New York subsidy will be exempt from scrutiny
in the United States under antitrust law and the commerce
clause. Why should the existence of the Canadian-American
border give rise to different treatment, if the market in question
is fully integrated and open?
Pursuant to American antitrust principles, state legislative
acts represent a declaration of the public interest.
To be sure, the legislature may be mistaken or unaware of the conse-
quences of its actions, or it may be responding to political pressures not
truly reflecting 'the public interest,' but the antitrust court may not
reappraise the legislature's assessment of the public welfare. Govern-
ment is its own judge of how much competition is desirable.4 2
Therefore, subsidy programs introduced by a legislative act are
immune from antitrust scrutiny. By virtue of the "state action"
doctrine as first formulated in Parker v. Brown, activities au-
thorized by the state will only be exempt from antitrust scrutiny
if there is adequate state supervision and state action which is
clearly intended to displace antitrust law.43 Areeda and Turner
41. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic
Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989). The author posits:
Although enforceable multilateral covenants prohibiting inefficient
subsidy practices may well be in the mutual interest of participating
nations, the unilateral imposition of countervailing duties on "subsi-
dized" imports does not systematically promote national economic wel-
fare, and existing law is poorly tailored to identify the cases in which
countervailing duties are arguably beneficial. Instead, the duties are
imposed mechanistically under conditions that may often produce a
considerable net welfare loss to the U.S. economy. As a consequence,
duties under existing law will enhance national economic welfare only
by chance. Because the need for any type of countervailing duty policy
is questionable, abolition of the countervailing duty laws might best
serve the national economic interest.
Id. at 200-01 (footnotes omitted).
42. 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 202b (1978).
43. Id. 211. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Supreme Court
rejected a contention that statutory restrictions on the marketing of privately
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suggest that the rationale for the requirement of state supervi-
sion is that "a state may be free to determine for itself how much
competition is desirable, provided that it substitutes adequate
public control wherever it has substantially weakened competi-
tion."44 A state subsidy program which is supervised by state
officials should be accorded Parker immunity if it could not be
protected as an express legislative act. The requirement of state
intent to displace antitrust scrutiny should not arise in the cir-
cumstances of the administration of a subsidy program, as it
would be highly unlikely that the state would intend that its
grant of a subsidy should be subject to private penalties under
federal antitrust laws if they have an anti-competitive impact.
Even if subsidies were subject to antitrust scrutiny, a strong
argument can be made that no liability would be imposed under
the Sherman Act4 5 or the Robinson-Patman Act.4 6 The only
type of economic inefficiency which appears to result from subsi-
dies has been found not to be actionable by the Supreme Court.
Posner has argued in the context of predatory and discrimina-
tory pricing that "[t]he misallocative effects of a firm's selling a
product below cost, thus inducing inefficient substitution toward
it, are not reduced by its subsequently selling the product at a
monopoly price and thus inducing substitution away from it."1
4
He argues elsewhere with respect to subsidies that
[a] subsidy designed to enable a firm to sell its product at a price below
marginal cost produces the same distortion as monopoly power that
enables it to sell the product above cost: the subsidy and resulting price
change attract consumers from products that are socially less costly to
produce, just as monopoly pricing deflects consumers to products that
are socially more costly to produce."
4 8
Thus, Posner suggests that subsidies represent only the first
kind of misallocation-inefficient substitution towards the prod-
uct as a result of the subsidy. However, in Brooke Group the
Supreme Court held that this kind of misallocation was not
actionable:
produced raisins violated the Sherman Act. Relying on principles of federalism
and state sovereignty, the Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to
anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States "as an act of government."
Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. On the topic of the state action doctrine, see generally
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 42, $$ 207-220 (describing the tension between
state antitrust legislation and federal preemption).
44. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 42, 213a.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1994).
47. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 187-88
(1976).
48. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 309 (4th ed. 1992).
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Although unsuccessful predatory pricing may encourage some ineffi-
cient substitution toward the product being sold at less than its cost,
unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers.
4 9
The protection of price competition is such that inefficient sub-
stitution toward the product does not provide a basis for liability
unless recoupment is likely through higher prices. If inefficient
substitution toward a product is not actionable according to
American antitrust law, why should it be actionable in the con-
text of trade with Canada? No principled distinction can be
made on the basis that the Brooke Group involved predatory
pricing and not a government subsidy. We suggest that modal
neutrality requires that similar treatment be given to the effect
of a particular activity notwithstanding the fact that the funding
for the activity might come from different sources. "Subsidiza-
tion" from any source should be treated in the same manner and
it should be irrelevant whether below-cost pricing is subsidized
from corporate resources or from some other source, such as gov-
ernment funding.50 If funding between divisions of a conglomer-
ate is acceptable, or between different product lines in a multi-
product firm, funding from a government source should not be
treated differently. Canadian government spending should re-
ceive the same treatment in the United States as American gov-
ernment spending.
Apart from the application of antitrust laws to state subsi-
dies, the question arises whether such programs would be ac-
tionable under the commerce clause, which is an important
limitation on state power.5 1 With respect to interstate com-
merce, federal law is paramount under the supremacy clause if a
49. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 224 (1993).
50. It has been argued that pricing below total cost represents a form of
subsidization. See Charles Purinton Shimer, Predatory Pricing: The Retreat
from the AVC Rule and the Search for a Practical Alternative, 22 B.C. L. Rev.
467,486 (1981) (discussing what the author considered to be judicial misconcep-
tions of the average variable cost rule). Such argument certainly has no merit
in the short term, as costs above marginal cost / average variable cost contrib-
ute to overhead and thus minimize losses. Prices below marginal cost / average
variable cost would be subsidized from some other source. In Brooke Group,
defendant Brown & Williamson's pricing was below average variable cost for a
period of 18 months, yet liability was not imposed, reflecting the importance the
Supreme Court attributed to the protection of price competition. 509 U.S. at 222
n.1 and at 231. What possible difference should it make whether the source of
the subsidy is a conglomerate, a different division in a multi-product firm or a
government?
51. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 42,
220. See also Frank P. Spinella, Jr., Antitrust's "State Action" Doctrine and the
Policy of the Commerce Clause, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 653 (1994) (discussing the
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state regulation conflicts with federal legislation5 2 and through
the "dormant commerce clause," federal authority may remain
paramount where no federal regulation exists. The U.S.
Supreme Court has formulated an analytical framework to de-
termine the scope of permissible state regulation. It has indi-
cated that the rationale of the commerce clause was to create
and foster "the development of a common market among the
states, eradicating internal trade barriers, and prohibiting the
economic Balkanization of the Union. ... When local legislation
thwarts the operation of the common market of the United
States, the local laws have then exceeded the permissible limits
of the dormant commerce clause. '5 3 It might appear from this
framework that state subsidies which have the same potential to
distort competition as foreign subsidies could be subject to fed-
eral regulation through the introduction of an American domes-
tic countervailing duty mechanism. The dormant commerce
clause has been described in the following terms:
The commerce clause has been recognized since the time of Chief
Justice Marshall as having a negative implication which restricts state
laws that burden interstate commerce. When the Court strikes down a
state or local regulatory act as inconsistent with the "dormant" com-
merce clause, it is interpreting the silence of Congress to hold that, in
the absence of federal legislation, the state or local law creates a trade
barrier or imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is inconsis-
tent with the principle that one state should not be able to gain an
economic advantage by shifting costs for its local benefits to out-of-
state persons or interests, particularly through the elimination of
competition.
5 4
And further:
[Tihe Congressional approval of state or local laws which create trade
barriers or otherwise regulate commerce in a manner that would not
be permissible under dormant commerce clause principles may in fact
create inefficient markets and cause economic hardship to persons in
some states through the shifting of economic burdens by states which
seek to promote local interests at the expense of interstate commerce.
intersection of the state action doctrine and the commerce clause in the context
of antitrust legislation).
52. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 274 (4th
ed. 1991). With respect to the supremacy of federal legislation see State of
Alaska v. FN Baranof, 677 P.2d. 1245, 1249 (Alaska 1984).
53. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 275-76. Cf AGREEMENT ON IN-
TERNAL TRADE (Can.) (July 18, 1994) (agreement between Canadian provinces
to, inter alia, minimize barriers to inter-provincial trade).
54. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 52, at 281.
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... [O]ne factor becomes imperative to the judicial tribunal-a le-
gitimate state regulation must not burden interstate commerce in
either purpose or effect unless the extent of that burden is outweighed
by a legitimate state objective that cannot be achieved in a less burden-
some manner.
5 5
This implies that the commerce power granted to Congress
might allow a domestic countervailing duty regime to discipline
state subsidies. There appears to be a difference, however, be-
tween the regulation of commerce and the subsidization thereof.
It has been argued that a state can subsidize local producers or
consumers and that there is no violation of the commerce clause
because the state is simply engaging in a form of welfare vetted
through the political process of the state itself:
When a state actually owns resources and favors its own citizens it
is not violating the commerce clause; it is simply engaging in a form of
welfare. It may be welfare for the rich rather than for the poor, but it
is not restricted by the dormant commerce clause.
The selling of state-owned resources to local residents at a lower
price that [sic] the state charges to out-of-state interests is consistent
with commerce clause principles because the state is acting as a "mar-
ket participant"-that is, the residents of the state are bearing the cost
of providing a welfare benefit to persons within the jurisdiction. When
the state is bearing the cost of providing economic benefits, there is
little reason for the Supreme Court to intervene, even though some
inefficiency in the marketplace might be created, because the political
process within the state should serve as an inner political check on the
state's decisions to participate in the marketplace. Thus, if a state of-
fers a company a cash bonus or tax exemption in exchange for the com-
pany locating a factory in the state, its action can be upheld because
the state is bearing the cost of producing some economic benefits for
people in the state. However, if the state seeks, by law, to force a com-
pany to keep its factory from the state or to give employment prefer-
ence to local residents, then the state law violates the commerce clause
because it attempts to shift to out-of-state interests the cost of produc-
ing local economic benefits.
5 6
One of the policies underlying the commerce clause is to ensure
that those affected by economic legislation are represented by
the legislating body. Subsidy programs presumably will be the
result of a legislative act and will, therefore, be consistent with
the commerce clause. Even in unusual circumstances where a
subsidy program was not eligible for protection as a legislative
act, the court will weigh the burden imposed upon out-of-state
concerns against the local benefit and the burden must be found
55. Id. at 282.
56. Id. at 298-99 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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"clearly excessive to the putative local benefits."57 Domestic
subsidies are often the first best measure to address a particular
social issue or concern, as they are closely targeted to the partic-
ular issue. Subsidies may withstand the kind of balancing of in-
terests required by the commerce clause.
The preceding analysis indicates that state and federal sub-
sidy programs appear to be exempt from the antitrust laws and
consistent with the commerce clause. In an increasingly inte-
grated market which has similar competition values and where
a commitment exists to open trade, it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to justify an exemption for one set of political choices from
another on the basis of an international border. Why is the do-
mestic political process an appropriate "inner political check"
and the Canadian political process inappropriate; why is the
American political process intrinsically superior to the Canadian
political process in this regard? It is submitted that a strong
case can be made for the elimination of countervailing duty
practices in the context of Canadian-American trade. If the
existence of NAFTA or the formation of a hemispheric free trade
agreement (the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas initia-
tive) will create open markets and foster economic integration,
countervailing duty practices should be eliminated within the
free trade zone. The only exceptions should be in circumstances
where a particular market or sub-market has not integrated due
to some artificial barrier to entry which is not efficiency-related.
C. THE FLAWED DEFENSE OF THE DETERRENCE OF
COUNTERVAILING DUTY PRACTICES
Proposals to eliminate countervailing duties on the ground
that they inhibit national welfare have been rejected by Profes-
sor John H. Jackson.58 While conceding that countervailing du-
57. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) sets forth the "modern
approach:"
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits....
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
Id. at 142.
58. John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Countervailing Duties, 21 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739, 742-45 and 754-55 (1990). Professor Jackson was re-
sponding to recommendations to eliminate countervailing duty practices made
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ties might not enhance national welfare, he argues that they
may promote world welfare and act as a deterrent which could
tend to prevent the kind of competitive spiral of subsidies which
has marked the agricultural sector and bedeviled past and con-
tinuing trade negotiations.5 9 He states:
To this author, it seems clear that the "thank you note" approach (no
response [to the provision of subsidies]) is justified only with respect to
the goal of national welfare, as opposed to world welfare. World expe-
rience, especially with respect to agricultural products (with the
United States and the EEC in a virtual subsidy war) reinforces the
need for this broader perspective.
... Many persons engaged in the study of subsidies and counter-
vailing duties are of the opinion that such duties do influence govern-
ments to limit subsidies.
... [I]f one believes that the world would be better off if there were
a general reduction of the use by governments of subsidies relating to
products that flow in international trade, one could argue that the U.S.
policies, motivated for entirely different reasons, may fortuitously or
coincidentally be having a salutary effect on the world economy. 60
Professor Jackson's support of countervailing duties-as well as
that of the other persons to whom he refers-appears to be not
sustainable because it tends to prove too much. No principled
argument appears to be possible on the ground of economic effi-
ciency or deterrence which successfully distinguishes the com-
petitive effect of American and Canadian subsidy programs
within North America in a manner exempting one and targeting
the other. It is clear that the accumulation of subsidies from the
various states and the U.S. Federal government will far exceed
the subsidies provided by Canada and its provinces. American
subsidies represent a much greater risk of market distortion and
of initiating a competitive spiral of subsidization than do Cana-
dian subsidies. Robert Reich has identified one example in
which four states competed for a Mitsubishi Diamond-Star Mo-
tors plant in 1985. Illinois "won" the competition with a ten-
year package of incentives worth $276 million-25,000 per
year for every new job created. 61 He states:
by Professor Michael J. Trebilcock in Is the Game Worth the Candle? Comments
on A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of
U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 723, 732 (1990), and
by Alan 0. Sykes in Second-Best Countervailing Duty Policy: A Critique of the
Entitlement Approach, 21 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 699, 700 (1990).
59. Jackson, supra note 58, at 742-45 and 754-55.
60. Id. at 754-55.
61. ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 296 (1992).
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In consequence, states, cities, and even countries have found them-
selves bidding against one another for the same global jobs. Who suc-
cessfully lures the jobs becomes a matter of state and local pride, as
well as employment; it may also bear significantly upon the future ca-
reers of state and local politicians who have pledged to win them. The
possibility of a new factory in the region sets off a furious auction; a
casual threat to move one already situated initiates equally impas-
sioned rounds of negotiation. The total amount of subsidies and tax
breaks thus flowing to global firms of whatever nationality is much
higher than it would be without such bidding. Nations whose constitu-
ent parts refrain from these internecine battles end up paying far less
to lure jobs their way; nations that agree with one another to refrain
from bidding altogether come out even further ahead.
6 2
In our view, the flaw in Jackson's argument is that one can-
not draw a line such that international subsidy competitions are
pernicious, while subsidy competitions between U.S. states and
cities are acceptable. What difference does it make if Windsor,
Ontario joins a competition commenced by Detroit and Buffalo
for the location of a new plant? Jackson's deterrence and eco-
nomic efficiency model requires that all state, provincial and fed-
eral subsidies should be treated in the same manner and subject
to the same standard of review. Thus, the United States would
be required to introduce a domestic countervailing duty mecha-
nism under the commerce clause. The European Community
has a competition law-based countervailing duty mechanism
which makes actionable the subsidies of its member states, 63
and it is one example of the kind of system required to ade-
62. Id. at 297.
63. The competition law chapter of the Treaty of Rome provides a compre-
hensive "state aids" system which is broader than the concept of a "subsidy."
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
92-94, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Specifically, the Treaty provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Mem-
ber State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain under-
takings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common
market.
Id., art. 92(1). If state aid in the form of a financial contribution strengthens
the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in
intra-Community trade, "competition must be regarded as distorted." BELLAMY
& CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAw OF COMPETITION 18-012 (4th ed. 1993). Juris-
diction at the community level is established, subject to a de minimis rule, if a
state aid is capable of affecting trade between Member States. Id. 18-014.
Trade can be affected in circumstances where the undertaking's products com-
pete with products coming from other Member States even if the aided under-
taking did not export its products. See, e.g., Case 102/87, France v.
Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 4067, 3 C.M.L.R. 713 (1989) (subsidized loan to
French brewery was capable of distorting trade even though the brewery was
not an exporter).
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quately address the concerns raised by Jackson. State, provin-
cial and federal subsidies would be actionable as long as they
involved interstate commerce.
Even if the introduction of such a mechanism were constitu-
tional, an issue which is beyond the scope of this Article, we do
not believe that Congress would ever consider legislation limit-
ing the power of the states in this regard. It is our view that
there is no likelihood that such a mechanism could be intro-
duced and thus, existing countervailing duty practices should be
eliminated in the context of NAFTA in circumstances where
markets are open and no artificial structural impediments exist
to trade. Governments should be able to stimulate industrial
development or to facilitate adjustment without fear of retalia-
tion. Where impediments to access exist in a particular market
or market segment (which are artificial in nature and are not
based upon efficiency), a remedy designed to promote the elimi-
nation of such impediments would be principled. 64 As a second-
best solution, existing countervailing duty practices might be
maintained where such impediments exist.
D. COUNTERVAILING DUTY REFORM AND THE SOFTrWOOD
LUMBER INDUSTRY
If such a reform were implemented in the context of Cana-
dian-American trade, it is questionable whether one of the most
celebrated trade disputes would be entitled to freedom from
scrutiny under countervailing duty provisions. The Softwood
Lumber6 5 dispute in its third iteration included a review of log
export restrictions which have existed in British Columbia since
the turn of the last century. As long as such restrictions existed,
64. It is not clear that the keiretsu would be illegal per se as an artificial
barrier. The existence of the keiretsu system has been argued in part to be a
result of efficiencies and may not be per se illegal in and of itself even according
to American antitrust principles. Suzanna C. Miller, A Double Standard: The
United States Plea for Per Se Illegality of the Japanese Keiretsu, 19 BROOKS J.
INT'L L. 1101 1127-28 (1993). While the keiretsu business structure itself might
not be per se illegal, its practices may well be found to be anticompetitive on the
basis of a rule of reason analysis. An example of such a practice would be resale
price maintenance within a vertical keiretsu. Harry First, Antitrust Enforce-
ment in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 137, 172 (1995); Julie A. Sheppard, Using
United States Antitrust Law Against the Keiretsu as a Wedge into the Japanese
Market, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 345, 355, 372 (1993). A further example might be
exlusive dealing within the keiretsu. Id. at 355.
65. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01USA, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (Binational Review) (Aug. 3, 1994). For an
analysis of this decision, see Gastle & Castel, supra note 29.
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and in the absence of a more principled mechanism which would
focus on the elimination of these restrictions, it would be diffi-
cult to argue that the softwood lumber industry in British Co-
lumbia should be free from scrutiny under the existing
countervailing duty provisions. 66
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY AS
AN ALTERNATIVE TO COUNTERVAILING
DUTY REFORM
If the elimination of countervailing duties is impossible be-
cause they are too politically entrenched, it may be possible to
achieve reform by permitting Canada and Mexico to coordinate
their technology programs with those of the United States. Co-
ordination may become increasingly necessary, due to the possi-
ble emergence of innovation programs as an instrument of
strategic trade policy in the United States. Globalization of
trade and the rapid pace of technological change have placed a
premium on technological innovation. The global economy is in-
creasingly driven by high technology, with global production
doubling in constant dollar terms between 1980 and 1990, in
comparison with a 23 percent growth in other manufacturing in-
dustries. OECD data indicate that output by high-technology
industries as a share of all OECD manufacturing, increased
from 17 percent to 26 percent. The share of high-technology ex-
ports from OECD countries grew by 50 percent from 14 to 21
percent of all exports in manufactured goods, during the same
ten-year period. 67
A. THE EMERGENCE OF INNOVATION POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA
Throughout the post-war period, the United States domi-
nated technological advancement in most sectors, while main-
taining an open market and being the engine of the multilateral
system. As American leadership in microelectronics, computers
and other key technological sectors became threatened, initia-
tives were undertaken in an apparent attempt to capture the
benefit of technologies developed by "American" companies. A
66. The log export restrictions are a border practice establishing permit
requirements for any exports which are designed to encourage the processing of
logs inside British Columbia. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
No. USA-92-1904-01, 86-112 and dissent of Dearden and Weiler at 163, 16
I.T.R.D. 1168 (BNA) (Binational Review) (May 6, 1993).
67. Government of Canada, supra note 31, at 1.
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
perception had arisen, with some justification, that American
companies were adept at developing new technologies, but had
not been particularly effective at successfully commercializing
advancements into new products or process innovations. 68 The
U.S. federal government passed legislation attempting to control
technology developed with government support,69 and clarified
antitrust principles with the passage of the National Coopera-
tive Research Act of 1984 (NCRA),70 such that consortia could
more easily be formed among American competitors within a
particular market segment. Initially, consortia included only
U.S. companies, but Canadian members were admitted to one of
the most important consortia, the Microelectronics and Com-
puter Technology Corporation (MCC), once the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement (FTA)71 was enacted. The statute
was amended by the National Cooperative Production Amend-
ments of 1993 (NCPA).72 These amendments extended the pro-
tection of the Act beyond research and development to
production consortia and also established requirements in-
tended to capture the benefits of consortia exclusively for the
United States. For example, production consortia are only enti-
tled to the antitrust exemption if the production activities occur
within the United States.73 As a result, production facilities in
68. See generally Gerald J. Hane, The Real Lessons of Japanese Research
Consortia, ISSUES Sci. & TECH., Winter 1993-94, at 56 (describing relative inef-
fectiveness of U.S. consortia in enhancing market competitiveness of U.S. in-
dustry due to lack of focus in organization of consortia, undue emphasis on
precompetitive research stage, and inefficient systems of diffusing progress to
industries at large).
69. In 1980, for example, the Bayh-Dole Act "marked a major retreat from
the principle that knowledge subsidized by the government should circulate
freely." Richard R. Nelson & Paul M. Romer, Science, Economic Growth, and
Public Policy, in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 49, 71 (Bruce L.R.
Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., 1996).
70. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 4302 (1994)).
71. Dec. 23, 1987, and Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
72. Pub.L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4303-06
(1994)).
73. The NCPA provides:
Notwithstanding sections 4 and 6, the protections of section 4 shall not
apply with respect to a joint venture's production of a product, process,
or service, as referred to in section 2(a)(6)(d), unless-
(1) the principal facilities for such production are located in the
United States or its territories, and
(2) each person who controls any party to such venture (including
such party itself) is a United States person, or a foreign persons
from a country whose law accords antitrust treatment no less
favorable to United States persons than to such country's domes-
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the United States will be exposed only to a single-damages rem-
edy if the consortium's activities are found to breach the anti-
trust "rule of reason" standard of review. However, if the
production facilities are located in Canada, the consortium faces
the punitive treble damages standard which is an important
part of American antitrust legislation.7 4
The growth of consortia in the United States has been sig-
nificant and, by 1995, 592 consortia had been registered pursu-
ant to the NCPA. The adoption of technology consortia followed
a trend in both Japan and Europe where consortia exist as an
institutional mechanism to pool research and development re-
sources and to distribute new technology. It appears to reflect
an acceptance of the importance of maintaining a North Ameri-
can industrial infrastructure of suppliers and manufacturers in
particular segments. Federal spending also increasingly began
to focus upon successful innovation of technological develop-
ments. An example is provided by the promotion of dual use
technologies as part of American defense technology spending,
the second or "dual" use being commercial application.7 5
The change in American technology policy has been de-
scribed as a "new paradigm,"76 which has been articulated by
President Clinton and Vice-President Gore in the metaphor "Sci-
ence, the Endless Resource" instead of "Science, the Endless
tic persons with respect to participation in joint ventures for
production.
Id. at § 4306.
74. Gary Luton, Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Policy Staff Paper, Diplomacy at the Leading Edge: Advanced Technol-
ogy and Canadian Trade Policy § 5.4.1(i) (Dec. 1995), available in <http:H
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/policy%5Fpapers/1995/
partl%5F12.htm>.
75. Funding through the Department of Commerce for the Advanced Tech-
nology Program (ATP) increased from $98 million in 1993 to an estimated $225
million in 1997 and a projected $275 million in 1998. H.R. Doc. No. 105-003,
supra note 31, at 79. It is projected to grow to $500 million by 2002. Id. Fund-
ing for Manufacturing Extension partnerships increased from $18 million in
1993 to an estimated $95 million in 1997 and a projected $129 million in 1998.
Id. This program is intended to give smaller manufacturers the technological
information and expertise to improve their operations. Id. at 80. This repre-
sents a five-year increase in funding for these two projects of 343%. In addition,
the budget proposes $225 million for Department of Defense Dual Use Applica-
tions (DUAP), "which will build on previous Federal dual-use technology devel-
opment programs and allow the military services to develop and use
technologies, processes, and products available to the commercial sector." Id. at
83.
76. Harvey Brooks, The Evolution of U.S. Science Policy, in TECHNOLOGY,
R&D, AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 69, at 15, 34.
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Frontier. '77 Science must not only create new knowledge
though continuous improvement, but also must improve the
human condition. David, Mowery and Steinmueller have de-
scribed this change in focus as follows:
The emphasis in science and technology policy has been placed on fos-
tering the generation of new knowledge, rather than the distribution of
knowledge and the possibilities of improving the performance of the
system by improving access to the existing knowledge stock. We too
are persuaded that this thrust has been maintained for too long, and
there is a case to be made now for restoring some balance; in other
words, to raise not only the marginal social rate of return on future
R&D expenditures, but to increase the social payoff from such outlays
made in the past by increasing the commercial exploitation of the
knowledge.78
The commercialization of technology underpins the concept of
innovation, and American innovation policy appears to be an at-
tempt to capture the social payoff.
As in the United States, technology policy has emerged as
an important issue in Canada. 79 Canada's low levels of research
and development spending have been attributed to its resource-
based industrial structure, relative lack of a developed high
technology sector and the large number of multinational enter-
prises which, generally, are perceived as carrying out their re-
search and development activities in their "home bases."8 0
Canada competes well in certain areas of telecommunications
and aerospace technology but, when compared to other G7 na-
tions, "Canada lags in its rate of technological innovation."''s
Canada's solution, as announced in the Federal Government's
new strategy "Science and Technology for the New Century: A
Federal Strategy," is to coordinate the emergence of a "national
innovation system" to foster the development of linkages be-
tween industry, government and business, particularly with re-
spect to the promotion of research and development.8 2 The
77. Id.
78. Id., quoting from Paul A. David et al., University-Industry Research
Collaborations: Managing Missions in Conflict (1994) (paper prepared for
Center for Economic Policy Research / American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Conference, "University Goals, Institutional Mechanisms, and the 'Industrial
Transferability' of Research," Stanford University, March 16-20, 1994).
79. See generally John N.H. Britton, Introduction to CANADA AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF STRUCTURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE 3-19 (John N.H. Britton ed., 1996).
80. MICHAEL PORTER, CANADA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REALITY OF A NEW
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 74-75, 114-15 (1991).
81. Britton, supra note 79, at 16.
82. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR THE NEW CEN-
TURY: A FEDERAL STRATEGY (1996).
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Federal Strategy concentrates upon the promotion of small and
medium enterprises,8 3 and also introduces Technology Partner-
ships, which are designed to be "forward looking, risk-sharing
instruments-an investment fund-to develop partnerships
with the private sector in achieving technological excellence," di-
rected in support of certain specific sectors.84 The partnerships
also appear to promote the formation of Canadian consortia,
among other initiatives.
B. THE COORDINATION OF AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
INNOVATION POLICY
Canadian and American innovation policies should be coor-
dinated within the context of an integrated North American
market. The emergence of innovation policy in the United
States, with nationalistic restrictions upon the participation in
technology projects, is not consistent with the open, integrated
economy which NAFTA is intended to promote. These restric-
tions appear to be based on a presumption that technology de-
velopment can be considered a kind of national asset which can
be captured and implies that policies intended to repatriate
technology spending by a nation's companies are an eligible op-
tion. This is inconsistent with the trend toward globalization
and an economy in which companies are losing national identity.
Canada might re-orient its industrial policy to the extent of
focusing it upon integrating the Canadian "innovation system"
into the North American innovation system which appears to be
emerging. The Federal Government could encourage Canadian
companies and universities to engage in the American consortia
and similar technology initiatives, and help provide the funding
for them to participate. This would have the benefit of encourag-
ing linkages between the Canadian and American innovation
systems, bringing Canadian companies into contact with some of
the most important technology companies in the United States
and giving them access to the development of leading technol-
ogy. This kind of strategy is consistent with the deep integra-
83. SMEs were responsible for 87 per cent of the new jobs created in Can-
ada during the 1980s. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, BUILDING A MORE INNOVATIVE
ECONOMY 19 (1995).
84. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, supra note 82, at 13. The fund is focused
upon environmental technologies; strategic enabling technologies (i.e. biotech-
nology and agriculture); advanced materials (ceramics, composites); selected in-
formation technologies (telemedicine); advanced manufacturing technologies
(robotics); and the aerospace and defense industries, including defense conver-
sion. Id.
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tion of the Canadian and American economies and is also
consistent with the Federal Government's Science and Technol-
ogy Strategy, which is intended to foster the development of
small and medium enterprises in a niche-driven economy. Inte-
gration of Canadian technology programs into American initia-
tives would tend to insulate the programs from retaliation
through countervailing duty proceedings commenced in the
United States. If such a challenge were to be made, Canadian
companies participating in the consortia would likely have a
political constituency in the United States supporting them
before the domestic tribunals.8 5
A question may arise whether the coordination of Canadian
and American technology programs would result in a diversion
of corporate innovation spending from Canada to the United
States. Canadian technology programs are vulnerable simply
because of their proximity to the United States and its scientific
establishment. Professor Michael Porter indicates that Canada
risks losing some of its "home base" functions due .to the greater
strength of the American congruence of factors contributing to
competitive advantage (the Porter "diamond").8 6 Apart from the
normal risk of diversion arising from economic integration, it
has been argued that Canada is particularly vulnerable to the
emergence of American innovation policy. Gary Luton, Deputy
Director, Economic and Trade Policy Division of Industry Can-
ada, argues that Canadian companies are increasing their tech-
nology efforts in the United States, with spending rising to $2
billion in 1990 or almost half the value of Canadian firms' R&D
spending in Canada. He concludes that:
A number of Canadian firms have invested heavily in R&D operations
in the U.S. to cultivate good economic relations with U.S. scientific and
political elites. American political elites, however, are becoming in-
creasingly demanding and protectionist. Clearly, even when formal
market access commitments have been made, investors are often frus-
trated by informal barriers.
8 7
85. Of course, American consortia may have restrictions on membership
and Canadian companies and academic institutions might not gain automatic
membership. We believe that NAFTA should provide that any consortia receiv-
ing public funding should by required to admit participants from NAFTA
members.
86. PORTER, supra note 80, at 74-75, 114-15. The four determinants of com-
petitiveness which are the basic elements of Porter's diamond paradigm are
factor conditions; demand conditions; related and supporting industry struc-
ture; and firm rivalry. The role of government and chance are also important
determinants. Id. at 53-67.
87. Luton, supra note 74, § 3.2.1.
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This is an intriguing argument and, if accurate, would have sig-
nificant implications for Canadian industry in the light of free
trade. An open trade regime might be considered inimical to the
competitive health of Canada's economy if it faced a serious risk
of diversion of research and development spending in a manner
accelerating and accentuating the normal risk of diversion iden-
tified by Michael Porter. If this were the case, Canada should
insulate its technology programs as much as it possibly could
from U.S. diversion and, in fact, should attempt to implement
programs intended to recapture Canadian technology spending
in the United States. We do not know what anecdotal evidence
Luton relies upon, if any. Fortunately, there are no trends in
technology spending which we could find which would confirm
Luton's conclusion and, based upon the references he provided,
it does not appear warranted.8 8
Tables I and III in the appendix to this Article set forth an
analysis of research and development spending trends in the
United States in an attempt to test Luton's conclusion. Table I
compares research and development spending of Canadian and
Japanese subsidiaries in the United States from 1981 to 1994.
It shows that technology spending by Canadian subsidiaries in-
creased by 42%, from $1.7 billion to $2.4 billion, between 1987
(the inception of free trade negotiations between Canada and
the United States) and 1994. Total spending by foreign subsidi-
aries in the United States increased by 239% from $6.5 billion to
$15.6 billion during the same period. Table III compares tech-
nology spending in the United States and Canada. Luton is cor-
rect that Canadian corporate technology spending has increased
to more than $2 billion U.S. It is also evident that Canadian
companies spend a significant proportion of their research and
development budgets in the United States ($2.16 billion U.S. vs.
$4.20 billion Cdn in Canada). Canada is a net exporter of corpo-
rate technology spending, with foreign spending in Canada
amounting to only $1.13 billion Cdn in 1993 which is well below
the spending of Canadian subsidiaries in the United States
88. Luton referenced a Statistics Canada report as support for the proposi-
tion that Canadian companies are spending $2 billion in the United States. The
report does not provide any information on technology spending in the United
States by Canadian companies. We then contacted Statistics Canada and were
advised that it does not track the technology spending of Canadian subsidiaries
in the United States and will not do so until at least the year 2000. Interview
with Lucie Lalibertie, Statistics Canada, Balance of Payments Division (Apr. 1,
1997).
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alone ($2.16 billion U.S.).89 However, to support an argument
that there has been a diversion of research and development
spending from Canada to the United States, one would expect
there to be some difference in growth rates between the levels of
spending which existed at the time free trade negotiations com-
menced and 1993, which is the last year for which information is
available. To the contrary, the spending by Canadian subsidiar-
ies in the United States increased by thirty percent, while Cana-
dian-controlled corporate research and development spending
increased in Canada by 51%. As a sub-component of this figure,
Canadian manufacturing spending in Canada increased by 38%.
On the basis of the information available, Luton's conclusion
that "[a] number of Canadian firms have invested heavily in
R&D operations in the U.S. to cultivate good economic relations
with U.S. scientific and political elites" appears to be incorrect,
insofar as it implies that this has been at the expense of re-
search and development spending in Canada.
This analysis suggests that thus far, FTA and NAFTA have
had no discernable impact on technology spending trends. It
also indicates that Canada has been an important contributor to
technology spending in the United States and that it is in the
interest of the United States to foster Canadian programs which
benefit the "North American innovation system."
C. BROADENING THE WTO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NON-
ACTIONABLE CATEGORY
Apart from coordinating innovation programs, reform of the
international trade law mechanisms could occur if the research
and development non-actionable category in the WTO Subsidies
Code was broadened. At the time of the GATT Tokyo Round ne-
gotiations in the 1970s, the United States successfully resisted
the inclusion of a list of permissible subsidies in the Subsidies
Code. Surprisingly, at the Uruguay Round, the United States,
at the last minute, supported a broadening of the research and
development non-actionable category specifically to permit the
activities of American technology consortia, such as
89. Of course, this analysis addresses only direct spending and ignores any
consideration of invisible technology transfer. See generally KRISTIAN PALDA,
INNOVATION POLICY AND CANADA'S COMPETITIVENESS 126-32 (1993) (explaining
that foreign-controlled firms' subsidiaries located in Canada rely partially on
technology drawn from R&D expenditures made outside of Canada, thus ap-
pearing to spend less on R&D when only Canadian R&D spending is counted).
[Vol. 7:1
1998] EcoNoMIc INTEGRTION & TRADE LAW REFORM 31
SEMATECH. 90 The support of the United States was reportedly
due to a comprehensive policy review undertaken to ensure that
the Subsidies Code "would not affect the U.S. domestic R&D
agenda of public-sector/private-sector technology partnerships
by subjecting them to countervailing action."9 1 Notwithstanding
this review, it appears that the activities of American consortia
well exceed the scope of the existing non-actionable category.
The Statement of Administrative Action 92 dealing with the U.S.
implementation of the Subsidies Code makes clear that the
United States considers the exceptions to be ambiguous and will
interpret them narrowly. The Statement provides:
With respect to subsidies for industrial research and pre-competitive
development activity, the administration considers it critical to draw a
careful, sharp distinction between genuinely pre-competitive activity
and later-stage development and production aid. In this regard, Com-
merce should not accord green light status to assistance for pre-com-
petitive development activity unless the pre-competitive nature of the
research is well established. In particular, the term "pre-competitive
development activity" must be strictly construed in order to prevent
circumvention of the intent of the provision.
9 3
A strong argument can be made that the research and de-
velopment non-actionable category should be broadened into a
technology exemption if the practices of American consortia
which gave rise to American support for the non-actionable cate-
gory are inconsistent with the activities which it permits. A re-
view of the performance of two of the key consortia in the United
States, SEMATECH and MCC, highlights the manner in which
each of them had to redefine its mandate from pre-competitive
research to shorter-term, near-market projects involving the
commercialization of technology. This is due to a recognition
that the traditional linear model of technological development is
flawed and that innovation does not involve a simple progression
from basic research, to applied research, to product develop-
90. Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 735, 772 (1995) (citing U.S. Tables Proposal for 11 Changes to GATT
Antidumping Text, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 3, 1993, at 1).
91. Luton, supra note 74, § 3.3.2. The fact that the philosophical change in
American trade policy is a relatively recent development is confirmed by the
opposition of the United States to the inclusion of a list of permissible subsidies
at the time of the Tokyo Round negotiations, which concluded in 1979.
92. Reprinted in PATTISON, supra note 1, at B-155.
93. Id. at B-156.
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ment, and then to manufacturing. 94 The linear model of innova-
tion has been described in the following terms:
Among other things, this pattern of thinking tended to reinforce a lin-
ear model of innovation in which research largely preceded engineer-
ing and development. Research thus dominated the innovation agenda
even though it absorbed only a small fraction of the total resources and
human effort going into the innovation process. Descriptions of the in-
novation process emphasized the flow of information from science to
engineering, and then successively to production and to the market.
Overlooked were the reverse flows back along the chain from the mar-
ket to production and to research as well as the leaps that often by-
passed the intermediate steps in the linear description. Thus, in the
idealized linear model, innovation begins with basic research that
turns up discoveries while being pursued almost without thought of
application. These discoveries in turn suggest opportunities for appli-
cations that are pursued through applied research, development, de-
sign, production, and marketing. In this model, the rest of the
innovation chain cannot exist without basic research, which is the
foundation on which the productivity of all subsequent investments de-
pends. This simplistic model, though increasingly challenged by schol-
arly research, has had an important and persistent influence on the
organization and management of innovation in the United States until
recently.9
5
The Technology Exemption appears to be based upon a linear
model of technological development. Article 8.2 of the Subsidies
Code permits "assistance for research activities conducted by
firms or by higher education or research establishments on a
contract basis with firms if the assistance covers not more than
75% of the costs of industrial research or 50% of the costs of pre-
competitive development activity."9 6 The terms industrial re-
search and pre-competitive development activity are defined as
follows:
The term "industrial research" means planned search or critical inves-
tigation aimed at discovery of new knowledge, with the objectives that
such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, processes
or services, or in bringing about a significant improvement to existing
products, processes or services. 9 7
The term "pre-competitive development activity" means the transla-
tion of industrial research findings into a plan, blueprint or design for
new, modified or improved products, processes or services whether in-
tended for sale or use, including the creation of a first prototype which
94. For a discussion of the linear model of technological development, see
Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield, Contributions of Research and Techni-
cal Advance to the Economy, in TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMvY, supra
note 69, at 1.
95. Brooks, supra note 76, at 21.
96. Subsidies Code, supra note 4, art. 8.2(a). The Code further limits this
assistance to certain research costs. Id.
97. Id., art. 8.2(a), n.28.
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would not be capable of commercial use. It may further include the
conceptual formulation and design of products, processes or services
alternatives and initial demonstration or pilot projects, provided that
these same projects cannot be converted or used for industrial applica-
tion or commercial exploitation. It does not include routine or periodic
alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing
processes, services, and other on-going operations even though those
alterations may represent improvements.
98
The structure of the provision seems to link the concepts of in-
dustrial research and pre-competitive development activity as
sequential steps in the development and design of new products.
Governments can fund 75% of the first stage, which is the indus-
trial research stage, but their funding must be reduced to 50% of
the next, or pre-competitive stage. Industrial research requires
the discovery of new knowledge which develops new products,
processes or services or improves them. Pre-competitive develop-
ment activity then appears to take the new products, processes
or services to a plan, blueprint or a prototype but one which is
not capable of commercial use. It also does not include routine
or periodic alterations to existing products or on-going opera-
tions. The research and development non-actionable category
supports elements in two of the stages of technology develop-
ment (basic and applied research) but not pre-production, pro-
duction or manufacturing start-up. 9 9
D. AMERICAN CONSORTIA AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN NEAR-
MARKET INNOVATION PROJECTS
SEMATECH and MCC found that technology development
and successful commercialization was a dynamic process marked
by discontinuous development. Their experience in this regard
is consistent with evolving economic theory. American experi-
ence with its key technology consortia thus supports an argu-
ment that a linear concept of innovation is not appropriate and
that a more dynamic interaction with the near-market activities
is necessary to achieve diffusion of the technology to the mem-
bers of the consortia. MCC was formed in 1983 "to conduct high-
risk, long-range research aimed at significant advances in
microelectronics and computer technology," and specifically "to
preserve and enhance U.S. predominance and preeminence in
microelectronics and computing."10 0 It eventually discovered
98. Id., art. 8.2(a), n.29.
99. See generally PALDA, supra note 89, at 50-60 (reviewing stages of linear
innovation).
100. E. RAYMOND COREY, TECHNOLOGY FouNTAINHEADs: THE MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGE OF R&D CONSORTIA 38 (1997).
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that successful innovation and diffusion required a "Level IV"'
technology transfer model' 0 1 involving near-market activities in
which technology developers and receptors interact in a two-way
dialogue with both contributing to the "market strength" tech-
nology emerging therefrom. 10 2 SEMATECH was formed in 1987
at a time when the American semiconductor industry was under
significant pressure from Japanese competition. It was origi-
nally a research facility to "provide the U.S. semiconductor in-
dustry with the domestic capability for world leadership in
manufacturing."10 3 It experienced difficulty in developing a re-
search agenda and "altered its research agenda to one that
sought to improve the technological capabilities of U.S. suppliers
of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and to strengthen
'vertical' cooperation between U.S. suppliers and U.S. users of
semiconductor process equipment." 0 4 SEMATECH's mission
shifted from "horizontal" research cooperation to "vertical" col-
laboration between semiconductor manufacturing and suppli-
ers.'0 5 It has been credited with establishing better linkages
between manufacturers and suppliers. SEMATECH, thus, be-
came more of a conduit for technology distribution and coordina-
tion than a pure research facility. Its activities do not appear to
constitute the development of new technologies and processes,
but rather the adoption of the best existing American technol-
ogy. It has done so by funding such activities as the purchase of
complex lithography equipment and delivering it to member
101. "Level IV" collaborative technology activities can be described as
follows:
Level IV transfer, technology application, centers on product commer-
cialization. Level IV builds cumulatively on the successes achieved in
attaining the objectives of the three previous stages, but market
strength is required. Feedback from technology users drives the trans-
fer process. Success is measured in terms of ROI (return on invest-
ment) or market share. Here, we take a longer-term view.
DAVID V. GIBSON & EVERETT" M. ROGERS, R&D COLLABORATION ON TRIAL 337
(1994).
102. See id. at 271-75 (describing MCC spinout companies as a means of
transfering technology); 334-40 (describing difficulty of achieving Level IV
transfer); 403 (describing MCC's focus on producing customer-ready technol-
ogy); 417-18 (evaluating MCC's success in technology transfer).
103. Id. at 505.
104. Peter Grindley et al., SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons
in the Design of High-Technology Consortia, 13 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 723,
730 (1994).
105. Id. at 724.
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companies for evaluation and joint development work.106 The
financing of this kind of equipment appears to be well beyond
the research and development non-actionable category within
the Subsidies Code, as it was fully operational, finished machin-
ery which was financed and not a "first prototype which would
not be capable of commercial use."
The activities carried on by the consortia and permitted
under the NCPA do not appear to fall within the research and
development non-actionable category when the activities are
supported by the public purse. Both MCC and SEMATECH
have been the recipients of significant government support in
the form of funding and subsidies, at times up to fifty percent of
their total funding.10 7 They changed their mandates due to the
problems inherent in technology transfer which, instead of a
technology-push or technology-pull process, was found to be a
far more difficult undertaking requiring close collaboration on
matters of commercial interest to the companies participating in
the consortia.
Consortia originally were established with the intention of
undertaking long-term, basic, pre-competitive research. This fo-
cus was expected to deliver new-generation technology revital-
izing American industry and allowing it to catch up with, and
surpass, Japan. The rationale behind establishing consortia is
based upon a politico-economic justification for government sup-
port of basic research: the social returns are higher than the
direct returns due to the inappropriability of the results by the
companies undertaking the research. It is also based upon the
neoclassical policy justification for including a research and de-
velopment, non-actionable category: subsidies for basic research
do not wrongfully distort the allocation of resources, only the
subsidization of the commercialization process causes the distor-
tion of resources. The problem of technology diffusion, as it
emerged in the experience of the consortia, challenges the tradi-
tional justification for public support of basic research. The ex-
perience of MCC and SEMATECH suggests that technological
spill-over does not easily take place after the basic research
stage, which, by definition, is the earliest stage of technology de-
106. Lucien P. Randazzese, Semiconductor Subsidies, Sci. AM., June 1996,
at 46-48. SEMATECH purchased 14 GCA "steppers" for $19 million. Notwith-
standing this purchase, GCA ultimately failed. Id. at 48.
107. By 1994, government sources provided almost half of the MCC contri-
butions. COREY, supra note 100, at 42. SEMATECH received $100 million from
government sources each year from 1987 to 1992 and $90 million each year
from 1993 to 1996, covering half its yearly operating budget. Id. at 9.
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velopment. A better model would acknowledge that diffusion oc-
curs, in reality, closer to the market when the technology has
been proven and when a successful adaption is likely because
linkages to existing production techniques or product design
have been established. The argument suggesting that public
spending is justified by spill-overs is turned on its head and now
becomes an argument in favor of public spending for the com-
mercialization of the technology. It is at that point that spill-
over can be expected to occur.
If the United States allows consortia to engage in near-mar-
ket innovation projects supported by the public purse, the Subsi-
dies Code should be amended to include a technology exemption
to allow this kind of activity. The challenge facing American in-
dustry is the development of products capable of commercial
use. The challenge does not appear to be the development of
prototypes unsuitable for commercial use, which is the existing
limiting condition in the definition of "pre-competitive develop-
ment activity" within the Subsidies Code. The United States
has an interest in broadening the exemption due to the advan-
tages which Japan appears to have over the United States, at
least with respect to the adoption and commercialization of tech-
nologies through government-sponsored consortia. l08
IV. PROCEDURAL REFORM-NAFTA CHAPTER 19
If antidumping and countervailing duties are to be elimi-
nated, NAFTA Chapter 19 would not be required and domestic
competition law mechanisms would be relied upon. 10 9 However,
if substantive reform is not possible, procedural changes to
Chapter 19 can be made which would improve dispute settle-
ment under NAFTA. The weaknesses of the binational panel
process have been highlighted by Softwood Lumber II110 and
the subsequent settlement agreement which Canada was forced
to enter under the threat of the commencement of Softwood
Lumber IV. Canada faced the imposition of at least a 10% pre-
108. See generally Hane, supra note 68 (describing why Japanese research
consortia are more effective than those in the United States).
109. The coordination or harmonization of NAFTA competition law is be-
yond the scope of this article. We note that before the elimination of antidump-
ing duties, Canada may want to eliminate the application of the treble damages
provisions of American antitrust law to cases of international price discrimina-
tion. In our view, antidumping duties should be eliminated and domestic com-
petition laws applied even if the United States is not willing to exempt
international price discrimination from the treble damages provision.
110. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, supra note 65.
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liminary duty which would have lasted at least three years,"1
until the final resolution of the case. It was by no means clear
that Canada would win the new dispute, due to the amendments
which had been made in the interim to American trade law. The
panel in Softwood Lumber III was the first to divide along na-
tional lines at both the Binational Panel and the Extraordinary
Challenge Committees levels, and it appeared to do so on the
critical issue of the measure of discretion which should be ac-
corded the domestic tribunals by the binational panels pursuant
to the American standard of judicial review.
A. WEAKNESSES OF THE NAFTA CHAPTER 19 MECHANISM
This dispute highlights three important weaknesses of the
Chapter 19 mechanism. First, the binational panels are shack-
led to a standard of judicial review and cannot effectively review
the merits of the dispute. Second, it does not address the prob-
lem of preliminary duties which represent a prejudgment rem-
edy available upon an unusually low evidentiary threshold,
effectively constituting a reverse onus of proof. Third, the Chap-
ter 19 mechanism does not provide any effective restriction upon
amendments designed specifically to overturn binational panel
findings. Article 1903 does provide a panel process for the re-
view of such amendments, but the panel determination is not
binding. The remedy is that the complaining nation can dupli-
cate the amendments which were the subject of the panel re-
view, thereby enabling Canada to ratchet its trade law up to a
new level of abstraction. The alternate remedy is to terminate
the agreement, which is no remedy at all, as the right to termi-
nate exists independently of this provision. The proof of the
weakness of this mechanism is that no panel appears to have
ever been convened to consider proposed amendments. Further-
more, we do not believe that Article 1905, which establishes a
special committee review process intended to safeguard the
binational panel system, can be used to deal with this situation.
The Chapter 19 mechanism could be improved by freeing
the panels from the domestic standard of judicial review and
changing it into a process of arbitration whereby the board
would exercise the powers of the administrative agencies. It is
clear that the United States considers arbitration to be an effec-
tive form of dispute settlement, as it is the mechanism of choice
111. Softwood Lumber III was commenced in October 1991 and the final de-
termination was not released until August 3, 1994, after which there was a
dispute whether duties collected on an interim basis had to be returned. See id.
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in investment disputes, which was the matter of most concern to
the United States during the NAFTA negotiations. 112
Chapter 19 could be improved by extending the binational
panel process to the preliminary duty stage. It would also treat
preliminary duties as extraordinary relief which should only be
granted if the implementing nation meets the kind of onerous
thresholds required for such relief within the domestic civil liti-
gation process.
Chapter 19 could also be improved by making the review
process under NAFTA Article 1903 binding and enforceable on
the Parties. NAFTA members then could be forced to retract
amendments which are designed to overturn panel findings or
are otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of NAFTA or the
WTO Agreements.
The reforms suggested above assume the continuation of
the binational panel process in its current form. An option
which we favor would be to replace the ad hoc panel system with
a permanent international trade review tribunal comprised of a
national of each of the three NAFTA countries and a presiding
member who is not a NAFTA national. The tribunal members
would all be appointed for a lengthy period or permanently, and
the decisions of the tribunal would be final and binding on the
parties. 113 Its decisions would also have the force of binding
precedent. However, in the United States, the creation of such a
tribunal may be subject to constitutional challenge.1 1 4
B. A RADICAL REFORM: BINDING WTO PANEL DECISIONS IN
NAFTA ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTY DISPUTES
A further and alternative route of reform would be to elimi-
nate the Chapter 19 mechanism in favor of binding and enforce-
112. NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 11, § 3, art. 1115-38. See also Gastle, supra
note 90, at 800-08.
113. For a discussion of this alternative, see Gastle & Castel, supra note 29,
at 890.
114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (all legislative powers vested in Congress);
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Presidential power to make treaties); art. III, § 1 (judicial
power vested in courts created by Congress). Note that the American Coalition
for Competitive Trade challenged the constitutionality of the present Chapter
19 mechanism on February 18, 1997. The case was scheduled to be heard by
the U.S. Court of Appeals on October 21, 1997. Canada, which was granted
intervening status on April 3, 1997, supports the U.S. government's position,
which is that NAFTA Chapter 19 fully meets constitutional standards. See
Canada's Brief on NAFTA Chapter 19, Sept. 5, 1997; P. Morton, Ottawa Attacks
"Misleading" NAFTA Challenge, FIN. POST, Sept. 9, 1997.
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able WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decisions in anti-
dumping and countervailing duty disputes involving NAFTA
Parties. 115 Since the WTO DSB can review preliminary deter-
minations, the underlying trade legislation and any amend-
ments thereto, it is better situated to impede unprincipled
amendments to domestic trade laws designed specifically to
overturn earlier determinations. The United States would have
to comply immediately with WTO DSB directions that the pre-
liminary determinations or trade law amendments were not
WTO-consistent. It would also be more difficult for the United
States to mount a campaign to overturn a favorable WTO DSB
result because the world trade community is now looking to the
United States to support the WTO and abandon its policy of ag-
gressive unilateralism. 1 16 The WTO DSB panel determinations
also would likely be more credible than Chapter 19 panel deter-
minations due to the advantages in due process provided by the
WTO's innovative appellate procedures.
Although few GATT disputes have occurred involving an-
tidumping or countervailing duty complaints, 117 the standard of
review which appears to be emerging is at least as broad as the
American standard of "substantial evidence" on the record. 1 18
115. The DSB hears and decides disputes that arise under the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding (DSU). Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes, Article 37, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL IN-
sTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
The WTO DSB determinations are not directly enforceable in the courts of the
WTO Parties; as a result, the Parties are not required to implement the recom-
mendations of the DSB panels. While removal of the offending measure or pro-
vision is the primary objective of the WTO DSB, if the defaulting Party refuses
to comply, the complaining Party's only remedy is to suspend the application of
benefits of equivalent effect until a resolution has occurred. Our recommenda-
tion is that the WTO DSB panel determinations in anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations be made directly enforceable in the domestic courts
of the NAFTA Parties.
116. THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETAL-
IATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 1-3 (1994).
117. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYsTEM 345-47 (1993). During the first 42
years, twenty GATT dumping or countervailing duty complaints were filed,
with eleven violation rulings. Id.
118. Judge Wilkey has acknowledged the difference between an interna-
tional standard of review and the American standard of review, noting in refer-
ence to Article 17.6 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, "I . . . suggest that this
provision is about as good a standard of review by an international body as we
are likely to be able to negotiate in a treaty with other countries, considering
the accepted divergence in standards among various countries." Accession of
Chile to NAFTA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
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This potential reform has been criticized on the basis that
the WTO DSB requires governments to commence the proceed-
ings, as private parties have no direct access to them, whereas
this is not the case with respect to Chapter 19 panel proceed-
ings.119 An amendment to the Canadian Special Import Meas-
ures Act, 120 and similar U.S. and Mexican legislation, could
require Canada, the U.S., or Mexico to commence WTO com-
plaints when petitioned to do so. There is also the issue of legal
fees. Private parties could be required to pay for counsel accept-
able to their governments, which would continue to have the op-
tion, as in NAFTA Chapter 19 proceedings, to appear in those
disputes which were felt to raise important questions of national
interest. This probably would include most if not all proceedings
involving countervailing duty disputes.
Critics should also remember that a practice has developed
of taking certain aspects of trade disputes before a Chapter 19
panel and also before a WTO DSB panel with respect to issues
which cannot be determined by the Chapter 19 panel. For ex-
ample, Softwood Lumber 111121 was taken before GATT with re-
spect to the self-initiation of the investigation, along with
certain other aspects of the dispute which the binational panel
on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 80 n.2 (1995) (testimony of Malcolm R.
Wilkey, U.S. Circuit Judge (Ret.)). The pertinent provision of the Antidumping
Code provides that, in examining the matter,
(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall deter-
mine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was
proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased
and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the
evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel
might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall
not be overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public in-
ternational law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision
of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpreta-
tion, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in con-
formity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations.
Antidumping Code, supra note 5, art. 17.6, at 193.
119. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904.5. See also Rules of Procedure for
Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews, 128 C. GAZ. 1012 rr.3, 39 (Part I) (Feb.
12, 1994); NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1116-17 (claims by investors).
120. R.S.C. 1985, ch. 5-15, as am.
121. Two disputes have been taken to GATT panels notwithstanding that
FTA panels were also convened: United States-Countervailing Duties on
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Jul. 11, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D.
(38th Supp.) at 30 (1992), and United States-Measures Affecting Imports of
Softwood Lumber from Canada, GATT Doc. SCM1162, adopted on Oct. 27,
1993.
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could not determine. Had there been a binding GATT mecha-
nism, the duties would have been repaid in October 1993 instead
of a year later. If the Chapter 19 panel determination had been
made by a binding WTO DSB panel, the world trading commu-
nity would have had a stake in ensuring that the United States
could not simply change the rules as they did and launch a new
dispute in the expectation of a reversal of outcome.
This reform would also have an important benefit for the
multilateral trade system. For the first time, WTO panel deter-
minations would be binding and enforceable on the United
States. As a result, it would provide an important precedent for
the future development of the multilateral trade dispute mecha-
nism. It would also provide an important opportunity to build a
body of WTO trade law through a method which would allow
non-NAFTA parties to participate in the process.
A different approach to the question of reform would be to
change the focus of Chapter 19 panels. Instead of the present
system, Chapter 19 panels could perform the function of the
WTO and apply its international standard of review, with pri-
vate parties continuing to have a direct right of access and the
resulting decisions being binding and directly enforceable upon
the NAFTA Parties. The panels would thereby be free from the
American practice of deference, and the underlying trade laws
could be challenged, along with preliminary determinations.
Even Judge Wilkey122 recognizes that the international stan-
dard of review before WTO DSB is not encumbered by the Amer-
ican tradition of deference to domestic administrative tribunals.
This is a second-best solution, as it would duplicate the WTO
DSB mechanism and become a competing source of WTO law.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, antidumping and countervailing duty mecha-
nisms are unprincipled and should be eliminated in NAFTA. It
should be recognized that the North American economy has
evolved beyond nineteenth-century concepts of territorial sover-
eignty and that new approaches are required which recognize
and reward the openness of the Canadian economy and its com-
mitment to further integration with the United States. New
mechanisms should be designed which are based upon market
access principles having as their objective opening up markets
122. The American member of the Softwood Lumber III Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Committee who released a strongly worded dissent criticizing the Chap-
ter 19 binational panel mechanism.
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which are insulated by artificial barriers to access. If such fun-
damental reform is not possible, North American technology
programs should be coordinated and international reform
should focus upon broadening the technology exemption. Proce-
dural changes to Chapter 19 would also improve NAFTA dispute
settlement, with a more radical option being the elimination of
Chapter 19 in favor of a binding WTO dispute settlement
mechanism.
TABLE I
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SPENDING
BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
Total Foreign Canadian Japanese
spending in U.S. Subsidiaries in U.S. Subsidiaries in U.S.
1994 15,602 (+10) 2,363 (+10) 2,013 (+12)
Growth
since
'87 (+239) (+42) (+655)
1993 14,199 (+37) 2,159 (+0.4) 1,801 (+9)
1992 13,695 (+15) 2,151 (+4) 1,656 (+22)
1991 11,872 (+ 3) 2,060 (+6) 1,353 (+4)
1990 11,522 (+22) 1,944 (+11) 1,307 (+59)
1989 9,465 (+21) 1,758 (-3) 822 (+44)
1988 7,834 (+20) 1,804 (+8) 571 (+86)
1987 6,521 (+11) 1,666 (+8) 307 (+5)
1986 5,804 (+12) 1,542 (-1) 292 (+9)
1985 5,240 (+11) 1,550 (+10) 267 (+27)
1984 4,738 (+14) 1,405 (+16) 210 (+23)
1983 4,164 (+11) 1,212 (+17) 171 (+21)
1982 3,744 (+20) 1,032 (+32) 141 (-1)
1981 3110 777 142
Data for total foreign spending in the United States for the years 1981-1991 appears in BUREAU
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: OPERATIONS OF U.S.
AFFILIATES OF FOREIGN COMPANIES, PRELIMINARY 1994 ESTIMATES tbl. 5.1. The remainder of
the data was supplied by Ray Mataloni, an Economist with the Bureau, whose assistance is
gratefully acknowledged. 1994 data represents preliminary estimates, while previous years
represent revised estimates.
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TABLE II
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SPENDING
IN U.S. CANADIAN & JAPANESE SUBSIDIARIES,
COMPARATIVE SHARES
(Millions of dollars)
Total
Foreign Canadian Japanese Total Canadian Japanese
spending in Subsidiaries Subsidiaries Foreign Mfg Subsidiaries Subsidiaries
U.S. in U.S. in US. spending - Mfg - Mfg
1994 15,602 (100) 2,365 (15) 2,013 (13) 12,917 (100) 2,289 (18) 1,207 (9)
1993 14199 2,159 (15) 1,801 (13) 11842 2081 (18) 1084 (9)
1992 13695 2,151 (16) 1,656 (12) 11413 2,080 (18) 1,189 (10)
1991 11872 2,060 (17) 1,353 (11) 8476 n/a n/a
1990 11522 1,944 (17) 1,307 (11) 8212 n/a n/a
1989 9465 1,758 (19) 822 (9) 6968 n/a n/a
1988 7834 1,804 (23) 571 (7) 5656 n/a n/a
1987 6521 1,666 (26) 307 (5) 5573 n/a 250 (4)
1986 5890 1,542 (26) 292 (5) 3811 n/a n/a
1985 5240 1,550 (30) 267 (5) 3335 n/a n/a
1984 4738 1,405 (30) 210 (4) 2990 n/a n/a
1983 4164 1,212 (29) 171 (4) 2586 n/a n/a
1982 3744 1,032 (28) 141 (4) 2403 n/a n/a
1981 3,110(100) 777 (25) 142 (5) 2092 n/a n/a
Data in the first three columns reproduced from Table I, supra. Remainder of data provided
by Ray Mataloni, drawn from Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, published by
the U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of
Economic Analysis. 1994 data represents preliminary estimates while previous years
represent revised estimates.
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF TECHNOLOGY SPENDING BY
CANADIAN-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES & CANADA
Total Corp Cdn- Total Fgn Total Cdn
Total Foreign Canadian R&D controlled Corp R&D Mfg
spending in Subsidiaries Spending in corp R&D spending in spending in
U.S.(1) in U.S.1  Canada
2  in Cda(3  Canada3  Cda(4)
1994 15,602 (+10) 2,365 (+10) 7,018 (+7) n/a (5)  n/a (5)  4,256 (+6)
1993 14,199 (+37) 2,159 (+0.4) 6,547 (+12) 4,195 1,125 4,028 (+10)
Growth
Since
1987 (+218) (+30) (+51) (+54) (+54) (+38)
1992 13,695 (+15) 2,151 (+4) 5,845 (+7) n/a (5)  n/a (5)  3,668 (+3)
1991 11,872 (+ 3) 2,060 (+6) 5,439 (+4) 3,480 (+4) 980 (+7) 3,576 (+1)
1990 11,522 (+22) 1,944 (+11) 5,244 (+8) 3,362 (+10) 916 (+13) 3,532 (+7)
1989 9,465 (+21) 1,758 (-3) 4,836 (+4) 3,046 (+6) 810 (-3) 3,288 (+3)
1988 7,834 (+20) 1,804 (+8) 4,642 (+7) 2,863 (+5) 833 (+14) 3,184 (+9)
1987 6,521 (+11) 1,666 (+8) 4,342 (+8) 2,719 (+4) 730 (+34) 2,921 (+8)
1986 5,890 (+12) 1,542 (-1) 4,023 (+11) 2,615 (+13) 546 (+5) 2,705 (+5)
1985 5,240 (+11) 1,550 (+10) 3,635 (+20) 2,324 (+43) 518 (+0) 2,584 (+15)
1984 4,738 (+14) 1,405 (+16) 3,022 (+16) 1,629 (+1) 516 (+20) 2,242 (+11)
1983 4,164 (+11) 1,212 (+17) 2,602 (+5) 1,608 (-5) 431 (+61) 2,012 (+3)
1982 3,744 (+20) 1,032 (+32) 2,489 (+17) 1,698 (+11) 268 (+70) 1,950 (+15)
1981 3110 777 2124 1534 158 1692
(1) Tables provided by Ray Mataloni, drawn from Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics
Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1994 data represents preliminary estimates
while previous years represent revised estimates.
(2) STATISTICS CANADA, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: 1995 INTENTIONS 58 tbl. 2.
3 Id. tbl. 9. 1994 numbers are preliminary estimates and 1993 figures are actual expenditures.
4 Id. tbl. 3. Data for Table 9 and Table 3 for years 1981 through 1993 were provided by Don
O'Grady of Statistics Canada and we gratefully acknowledge the compilation which he
undertook for us. Of course, any error in the interpretation of these numbers is solely our
mistake.
5 Data not available because of a reduced survey (per Don O'Grady).
